A Short Refutation of Skeptical Theism
Another Extract From My Article "Why I Don't Believe In God"
Introduction
Skeptical theism argues that even if we don’t know the justification God has for allowing certain evils, that doesn’t mean such a justification doesn’t exist. The idea is that God is much wiser than we are, so it’s possible that we simply lack the cognitive capacity to understand His reasons. For example, from a child’s perspective, going to the dentist seems bad, but the parents, with greater understanding, recognize it as beneficial. Similarly, God would be like the parents, and we would be like the child. Prominent proponents of skeptical theism include Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, and William Alston.
Why Skeptical Theism Doesn’t Work
Conflict With Other Theological Considerations
The first issue I see with this response is that it seems to conflict with core theological doctrines found in major forms of theism. According to texts like the Bible, the Quran, and the Torah, humans are not meant to be fundamentally in the obscurity or so deceived about the moral landscape. God has endowed us with cognitive and moral faculties sufficient to make morally responsible decisions. Our ability to discern right from wrong is central to our purpose on Earth. Skeptical theism, by suggesting that we could be so mistaken about morality, appears to undermine this foundational aspect of theistic belief.
Entailment of Global Skepticism
The second—and more serious—problem is that skeptical theism seems to lead to global skepticism. Consider situations where it seems overwhelmingly obvious that there is no justification for the evil occurring, such as the case of Junko Furuta. Skeptical theism maintains that God, for reasons beyond our understanding, could have had a justification for allowing such events, even though we can’t imagine what that justification might be.
If this reasoning is valid, it opens the door to a much broader skepticism. For instance, I may believe there is a chair in front of me, but according to skeptical theism, God could have a reason beyond my comprehension for making me believe this, even if there is no chair. The same logic applies to moral values: I might believe that giving to charity is good, but there could be a hidden reason, known only to God, why giving to charity is actually bad.
This line of reasoning could apply to every belief or value we hold, leading to a collapse of our ability to trust any of them. This is why I believe that skeptical theism ultimately entails global skepticism.
The Mirror Objection
Finally, skeptical theists face what I call the 'mirror' objection. Its proponents argue that for any prima facie bad event for which we can’t identify a justifying reason, there could be hidden reasons making it good all things considered. However, the same reasoning can be applied in reverse—there could be hidden reasons making it bad all things considered. As a result, these hidden considerations seem to cancel each other out, leaving only the prima facie assessment, which supports viewing the event as bad.