A Successful Logical Problem of Evil ?
Is it logically possible for God and evil to coexist ?
Introduction
Logical problems of evil aim to demonstrate a contradiction, in the strict logical sense (i.e., p & not-p), derived from the following two claims :
God exists.
Evil exists.
Many philosophers have proposed logical problems of evil, J.L. Mackie being a typical example.
The Problem
A plausible formulation of this problem can be presented as follows, in the form of a proof by contradiction :
Evil is that which ought not to occur, all things considered.
A good God would prevent evil from occurring.
God exists.
From (2) and (3), it follows that there is no evil.
There is evil.
Since (4) and (5) form a direct contradiction ("There is evil and there is no evil"), maintaining logical consistency requires rejecting at least one of the premises. If we accept (1), (2), and (5), the only way to resolve the contradiction is to reject (3)—the claim that God exists.
Premises' Clarifications/Justifications
Premise 1:
Evil is not merely something that appears bad at first glance (prima facie) but is something that truly ought not to have happened, all things considered (pro toto). While people sometimes use "evil" loosely to refer to events that are only prima facie evil, this is a misleading way of speaking. When we genuinely call something evil, we imply, among other things, that it should not have occurred, even all things considered.Premise 2:
A common theistic response is that God may permit evil if He has justification for doing so. However, this move is blocked in this argument because we are not talking about prima facie evil that can be justified by greater considerations, but pro toto evil—events that shouldn’t have happened even from an all-things-considered perspective. This is the crucial part of the argument, as it prevents theists from resorting to traditional theodicies or skeptical theism.Premise 3:
For the proof, we assume that God exists.Premise 5:
It seems uncontroversial that some things have happened that should not have happened, even all things considered. To deny this premise, one would have to accept that everything that has ever happened should have occurred, which seems extremely implausible. For example, consider the case of Junko Furuta (or any horrendous event). It appears evident that this should not have happened—not just prima facie but pro toto.
Since (4) and (5) are contradictory, and we have good reasons to accept (1), (2), and (5), the only way to maintain logical coherence is to reject (3), concluding that God does not exist.
This formulation and some of those considerations regarding this logical problem of evil are inspired by youtube debates/discussions from Danny and Jack Angstreich and from a facebook post by David Pallmann.
Funny seeing this argument formalized on Substack after I’ve seen it floated around in the deep dark trenches of philosophy debate YouTube for the past few years haha. I did always like this way to go with the logical problem though, Jack (relatively sure it originated with him and Danny picked it up subsequently but I could be mistaken) has the right of it in that regard. I think the main issue is going to be whether the theist accepts that ‘the good’ is synonymous with what ought or ought not occur. The plausibility of this argument trades on the fact that, for instance the Holocaust, is ‘bad’. Then standardly we make the move to saying that means it ought not to occur. I think the theist has to put up a road block there and say they don’t accept that. They could also just reject that there are any pro-toto evils but I think that plausibly implies moral skepticism. Anyway, great write up of the argument!