I think the second point is a bit unfair. BB doesn't just assume that it's good to create happy people - he has multiple articles where he argues that the intuition of neutrality is untenable. In a debate with limited time, it makes sense not to go on a tangential arguing extensively for this.
I agree on the third point though. The problem of evil and the problem of divine hiddenness aren't just evidence against God in their own right - they also weaken any argument for God that assumes things about what he would do if he existed, since they show that either God doesn't exist, or he behaves way differently than we would expect.
I'm not sure how these two statements follow from God allowing (horrific) evils.
1. "Anything goes"
2. "What God would do or not do is a total mystery"
At best, only one or two things can follow from this. That God - who is morally perfect under Adelstein's view - can have morally adequate reasons for allowing horrific evils; such as by allowing it, further greater evils will be prevented. From here, to render this implausible, one would have to show God can't have morally adequate reasons for allowing these things or that it is improbable.
A second thing that, maybe, follows from this, is that theists of Adelstein's type, are led into a type of "mitigated skepticism" on what God would or would not do. Perhaps there is a decent number of particular events that we're unjustified in claiming God would do or not do (like creating five million McDonald's on the planet Mars) yet there still is a number of things that the theist is confident in saying what God would do or not do, such as God creating a world where there is a possibility that people come to recognize He exists.
Something analogous to this idea can be van Inwagen's "moderate modal skepticism" when it comes to knowing certain modal truths in remote matters. A quick example is that one is justified in thinking they could've bought a different chair or furniture to sit on at their home. But things become quite unclear if one thinks the moon could've been made of green cheese.
Of course, I do think Adelstein's "God would want to create conscious agents" can be reasonably challenged. But I don't think such a challenge can indeed defeat what Adelstein thinks what God would want (in this case, God wanting to create conscious agents because they're - intrinsically - good).
"God - who is morally perfect under Adelstein's view - can have morally adequate reasons for allowing horrific evils; such as by allowing it, further greater evils will be prevented."
Nope. God always had the option not to create in the first place. So the "to prevent greater evils" move is not available to him sadly.
That's a fair response, but it seems to push us into a disjunctive defense: either (a) God allows evil to prevent greater evils or bring about greater goods, or (b) God refrains from creating altogether. Given that someone like Adelstein has strong imaginative powers such that he can conceive a world with God allowing this is, all things considered, better than God not creating anything.
"God is perfectly fine with allowing all kinds of extremely horrific things : ... childhood cancer, torture, factory farming, slaughterhouses, wars, genocides, the Holocaust"
"At this point, it becomes clear that we can infer nothing about what God would or wouldn’t do. If allowing all of the above is consistent with moral perfection, then truly anything goes. So it is utterly unjustified to claim that we can predict that God would create conscious beings because it is good to do so, as what God would or would not do, as we saw, is a total mystery."
I could make another argument but I'm not sure it will ever satisfy you. I think the disagreement will bottom down about us having different concept of moral perfection. If you think moral perfection is compatible with allowing tortuous level of suffering for millions of years, then you're a bit too far gone.
I think the second point is a bit unfair. BB doesn't just assume that it's good to create happy people - he has multiple articles where he argues that the intuition of neutrality is untenable. In a debate with limited time, it makes sense not to go on a tangential arguing extensively for this.
I agree on the third point though. The problem of evil and the problem of divine hiddenness aren't just evidence against God in their own right - they also weaken any argument for God that assumes things about what he would do if he existed, since they show that either God doesn't exist, or he behaves way differently than we would expect.
Fair points!
I'm not sure how these two statements follow from God allowing (horrific) evils.
1. "Anything goes"
2. "What God would do or not do is a total mystery"
At best, only one or two things can follow from this. That God - who is morally perfect under Adelstein's view - can have morally adequate reasons for allowing horrific evils; such as by allowing it, further greater evils will be prevented. From here, to render this implausible, one would have to show God can't have morally adequate reasons for allowing these things or that it is improbable.
A second thing that, maybe, follows from this, is that theists of Adelstein's type, are led into a type of "mitigated skepticism" on what God would or would not do. Perhaps there is a decent number of particular events that we're unjustified in claiming God would do or not do (like creating five million McDonald's on the planet Mars) yet there still is a number of things that the theist is confident in saying what God would do or not do, such as God creating a world where there is a possibility that people come to recognize He exists.
Something analogous to this idea can be van Inwagen's "moderate modal skepticism" when it comes to knowing certain modal truths in remote matters. A quick example is that one is justified in thinking they could've bought a different chair or furniture to sit on at their home. But things become quite unclear if one thinks the moon could've been made of green cheese.
Of course, I do think Adelstein's "God would want to create conscious agents" can be reasonably challenged. But I don't think such a challenge can indeed defeat what Adelstein thinks what God would want (in this case, God wanting to create conscious agents because they're - intrinsically - good).
"God - who is morally perfect under Adelstein's view - can have morally adequate reasons for allowing horrific evils; such as by allowing it, further greater evils will be prevented."
Nope. God always had the option not to create in the first place. So the "to prevent greater evils" move is not available to him sadly.
That's a fair response, but it seems to push us into a disjunctive defense: either (a) God allows evil to prevent greater evils or bring about greater goods, or (b) God refrains from creating altogether. Given that someone like Adelstein has strong imaginative powers such that he can conceive a world with God allowing this is, all things considered, better than God not creating anything.
"God is perfectly fine with allowing all kinds of extremely horrific things : ... childhood cancer, torture, factory farming, slaughterhouses, wars, genocides, the Holocaust"
"At this point, it becomes clear that we can infer nothing about what God would or wouldn’t do. If allowing all of the above is consistent with moral perfection, then truly anything goes. So it is utterly unjustified to claim that we can predict that God would create conscious beings because it is good to do so, as what God would or would not do, as we saw, is a total mystery."
What's your argument that this follows?
What exactly have you trouble understanding about this inference ?
Not seeing an answer. Looks like some question rather than an argument. Let's just get the argument down.
"If allowing all of the above is consistent with moral perfection, then truly anything goes."
What's your argument for this claim?
1) If allowing all of the above is consistent with moral perfection, then moral perfection doesn't make any reliable prediction whatsoever.
2) If moral perfection doesn't make any reliable prediction whatsoever, then truly anything goes.
3) If allowing all of the above is consistent with moral perfection, then truly anything goes.
1) If allowing all of the above is consistent with moral perfection, then moral perfection doesn't make any reliable prediction whatsoever.
Just seems like the same claim in different words. What's the argument for this?
I could make another argument but I'm not sure it will ever satisfy you. I think the disagreement will bottom down about us having different concept of moral perfection. If you think moral perfection is compatible with allowing tortuous level of suffering for millions of years, then you're a bit too far gone.
Not sure what I'm looking at. Seems like some natural language ramble. Not sure. In any case, we're looking for an arg for this prop:
1) If allowing all of the above is consistent with moral perfection, then moral perfection doesn't make any reliable prediction whatsoever.
He’s a silly billy 😛