The Case For Antinatalism

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“If children were brought into the world by an act of pure reason alone, would the human race continue to exist ?”¹

Introduction

In this article, I aim to present the strongest possible case for antinatalism, defined here as the position that procreation is, in most cases, morally wrong or bad². This issue, I believe, is too neglected both in academic and informal circles given its importance. Let’s dive into it.

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Prevention of Harm To Other Beings

This argument states that procreation is wrong because of the harm the future created being will cause during their life. Those kind of arguments have traditionally been labeled ‘misanthropic arguments’ in the literature. There are various forms of such arguments, here is mine:

The majority of people are not vegan, and it is highly likely that their children will not be vegan either. In a separate article, I estimated that the average non-vegan is responsible for the deaths of approximately 223 animals annually (including both land and marine animals). Over a lifetime, this equates to thousands of animals. Therefore, if the average person refrains from procreating, it could prevent the deaths of thousands of animals. Even in the case of vegans procreating, the risk that the child may go back to eating animal products seems too high to be taken, especially considering the fact that we live in a mostly non-vegan world that tends to pressure individuals against going and staying vegan. Also, we should keep in mind that, although the average vegan causes much less harm, they still cause non-negligible amounts of harm through crop deaths for example. For those reasons, I argue that procreation is immoral.

In a syllogistic form :

1) If an action will very likely bring about the death of thousands of innocent individuals, and if that action is not necessary to prevent a harm of similar or greater magnitude, then this action shouldn’t be done.

2) Procreating will very likely bring about the death of thousands of innocent individuals, and procreating is not necessary to prevent a harm of similar or greater magnitude.

3) Procreation is immoral.

I focus here on the victims that the average humans cause through his eating habits, because it is very arguably the biggest source of harm in a human life, but there are many other ways in which the average human causes great harm. An example would be the vivisection industry, which wouldn’t exist if humans were not around. Altough it’s difficult to estimate, it seems that at least 100’000’000+ animals are tortured and killed each year worldwide in vivisection labs. E.g, a 2008 study published in the journal Alternatives to Laboratory Animals estimated that approximately 115 million animals were used in scientific research worldwide in 2005, and it’s very likely that the number is even biggger now in 2025. For more informations on vivisection, see also this and this. Although the direct perpetrators of vivisection are few, almost everyone is indirectly responsible.

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Better Allocation of Ressources

"Having kids—with all the financial and emotional commitments that parenthood involves—is the single greatest impediment to the realization of the benevolent ideal. To put this point another way: if you wish to help others, then the worst decision you can make is to become a parent, because your child will tie up most of your spare time and resources for the next two decades."³

The cost of raising a child in the U.S. from birth to age 18 is estimated to be around $300,000. If this amount were instead donated to highly effective charities—such as the Against Malaria Foundation—it could potentially save between 54 and 100 human lives (considering it costs $3,000 to $5,500 to save a single human life). This is merely one example. Even greater impact could be achieved by supporting effective animal charities, given their higher effectiveness. I also recommend donating to animal charities over human charities, because doing the latter is immoral, as I have argued in this article (see also this).

By choosing not to procreate and instead redirecting this money to effective charities, one could save dozens, if not hundreds, of lives. This idea was first brought to my attention in Stuart Rachels' article The Immorality of Having Children.

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Prevention of Harm For The Being Created

Those arguments contend that procreation is wrong because of the consequences it has for the future individuals brought into existence. Traditionally, those arguments have often been labeled ‘philanthropic’ in the literature. Below, I present four such arguments:

My Own Argument

1) We should avoid being responsible for non-consensually putting people in situations in which they might experience extreme level of suffering and from which they may want to escape and the only escape is suicide, unless doing so is necessary to prevent a harm of similar or greater magnitude.

2) Procreation implies non-consensually putting people in situations in which they might experience extreme level of suffering and from which they may want to escape and the only escape is suicide, and it is not necessary in order to prevent a harm of similar or greater magnitude.

3) We should not procreate.

About (1):

Consider the following scenario: Suppose you hire someone to kidnap an individual and place them in a community of people. In general, the kidnapped individuals adapt well and find contentment in their new environment. However, a small percentage experience such profound dissatisfaction that they desperately wish to leave. Also, a non-negligible percentage of the people will at some point get gratuitously tortuted by the community. Unfortunately, there is no way to exit the community; the only available escape is suicide. Clearly, such an action would be morally indefensible. This is precisely the ethical concern outlined in point (1).

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About (2):

A small percentage of people experience life as unbearable and no longer wish to continue living, with suicide being the only mean of escape. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), more than 720,000 people die by suicide each year worldwide. Additionally, for every suicide, there are an estimated 20 suicide attempts.

It is also crucial to recognize that suicide statistics are often underreported in many regions due to social stigma, cultural taboos, and legal concerns. As a result, the actual figures may be significantly higher than what is officially documented.

Furthermore, it is important to consider that suicide is both highly socially unacceptable and fundamentally opposed to our natural survival instincts. Given these strong deterrents, one must ask: What would the suicide rate be if these factors were not in place? If individuals could approach the decision more rationally, without societal pressures or instinctual barriers, it is plausible that the rate of suicide would be considerably higher than it currently is.

About the extreme levels of suffering : Anyone is under a non-negligible risk of experiencing extreme levels of suffering at least once during their life, whether it is from cancer, heart diseases, severe depression, being tortured, being raped, getting paralysed…

Finally, procreating is not necessary to prevent any harm, to the contrary, as I have argued with the preventon-of-harm-to-other-beings and the better-allocation-of-ressources argument, abstaining from procreating is very likely to reduce huge amount of harm.

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Erik Magnusson’s Style Argument

Inspired by Erik Magnusson’s article’s “On Risk-Based Arguments for Anti-Natalism”, I have modified his argument slightly to strengthen it:

1. It is impermissible to non-consensually impose a risk of catastrophic harm on others unless doing so is necessary to avoid harm of a similar or greater magnitude.

2. Bringing a child into existence entails non-consensually imposing a risk of catastrophic harm on that child, without this being necessary to prevent harm of a similar or greater magnitude.

3. Therefore, it is impermissible to bring children into existence.

The first premise seems quite plausible. For instance, if someone forced another person to play Russian roulette without a compelling reason (i.e., avoiding harm of similar or greater magnitude), or if someone were to drive in a highly populated area while being very drunk. Those actions would clearly be immoral. This is essentially what the first premise asserts.

The second premise seems quite robust as well. A child cannot consent to their own creation, as they do not exist prior to being brought into existence. Moreover, life inherently entails risks of catastrophic harm, such as cancer, heart disease, paralysis, severe depression, rape, torture, etc., or even death in itself, one could argue. The degree of risk varies, but these possibilities are universal. Importantly, bringing a child into existence is not necessary to prevent harm of a similar or greater scale. In fact, as argued earlier in the prevention-of-harm-to-other-beings and better-allocation-of-ressources arguments, refraining from procreation actively reduces harm.

Benatar says :

“To bring a new person into existence is to create a being that is vulnerable to these and thousands of other kinds of appalling suffering. To procreate is thus to engage in a kind of Russian roulette, but one in which the “gun” is aimed not at oneself but instead at one’s offspring. You trigger a new life and thereby subject that new life to the risk of unspeakable suffering. Even those who are not antinatalists should be alarmed at how little thought seems to be given to this by the overwhelming majority of procreators. However, the risks of these harms should not merely give potential procreators pause. It should stop them from breeding.”⁴

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Hereth And Ferruci’s Style Argument

This argument, inspired by the work of Hereth and Ferrucci, has been modified slightly for clarity and strength:

1. We should avoid being responsible for non-trivial harms to others to which they neither consent nor are liable, unless doing so is necessary to prevent harm of a similar or greater magnitude.

2. If we create people, they will experience non-trivial harms to which they neither consent nor are liable, and these harms are not necessary to prevent harm of a similar or greater magnitude.

3. Therefore, we should avoid creating people.

The first premise seems quite plausible. For example, if you were to hire someone to break an innocent person’s arm without their consent and without doing so to prevent a harm of similar or greater magnitude, this action would be clearly immoral. This is the essence of the first premise.

The second premise seems correct as well. Every person, at some point in their life, suffers at least one harm comparable to having their arm broken, I don’t even need to give examples there. Future individuals cannot consent to these harms, as they do not yet exist. Moreover, creating them is not necessary to prevent a harm of similar or greater magnitude. Again, as I argued earlier with the prevention-of-harm-to-other-beings and better-allocation-of-ressources arguments, the reverse is true: refraining from procreation prevents significant harm.

“By being caused to exist as persons, children are forced to assume moral agency, to face various demanding and sometimes wrenching moral questions, and to discharge taxing moral duties. They must endure the fairly substantial amount of pain, suffering, difficulty, significant disappointment, distress, and significant loss that occur within the typical life. They must face and undergo the fear and harm of death. Finally, they must bear the results of imposed risks that their lives may go terribly wrong in a variety of ways."⁵

Quality-of-Life Arguments

Quality of life arguments claim that procreation is immoral because the average quality of life is sufficiently poor to render existence not worth starting. I consider these arguments to be more contentious, but still very much worth discussing. Here is my own quality-of-life argument :

Work consumes an enormous portion of our lives. Regardless of one’s feelings toward their job, the requirement to work imposes a significant restriction on personal freedom. This obligation, inherent to existence in this world, forms the basis for a moral critique of bringing new human lives into existence.

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The Facts : Work in Switzerland

Because that’s where I live, let’s consider Switzerland. According to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, as of 2023, the average weekly working hours for employed persons was 31.2 hours. This average varies slightly by gender, with men working approximately 35.5 hours per week and women 26.3 hours per week.

For full-time employees, the standard weekly hours are higher, averaging 41.7 hours, with actual hours worked averaging 40.2 after accounting for absences and overtime. Legally, the maximum weekly working hours are capped at 45 hours for certain industries and 50 hours for others.

The expected duration of working life in Switzerland is around 40.8 years. This statistic reflects the total number of years an individual is anticipated to be active in the workforce, excluding periods of education, retirement, or unemployment.

When calculated over a lifetime, this translates to approximately 59,829 hours of work, even accounting for five weeks of vacation annually. This staggering number illustrates the enormity of the time spent on labor during one’s life.

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A Global Perspective

Around the world, the number of hours spent working varies :

• United States: As of November 2024, the average weekly working hours were 34.3.

• France: In September 2024, workers averaged 31.2 hours per week.

• China: The average was much higher at 48.9 hours per week in November 2024.

• Germany: Annual hours worked equated to about 25.8 hours per week on average in 2023.

• Mexico: With 2,206 annual hours worked, the weekly average was around 42.4.

• South Korea: Workers averaged 36.5 hours per week based on 1,895 annual hours in 2023.

While the intensity of labor differs across countries, the necessity of work—and the vast portion of life it consumes—is a shared human experience.

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The Argument

For a lot of people, working is something unpleasant. Even for those who enjoy their jobs, such as myself, who teaches Brazilian Jiu-Jitsu for a living, work remains a constraint. It is something one must do, regardless of preference, to survive. At best, it is a limitation on freedom. At worst, it is both unpleasant and a limitation on freedom.

This leads to the following argument :

1. It is immoral to bring about conditions, without the consent of the person affected, in which they will have to do something they dislike and/or will be forced to do for an enormous amount of time.

2. Giving birth implies bringing about such conditions for the person being born.

3. Therefore, giving birth is immoral.

Even in ideal circumstances, where work aligns with personal interests, the requirement to work remains an impairment on freedom. By creating a new life, one ensures that the individual will need to work to sustain themselves, subjecting them to this inherent limitation on freedom and potential huge unpleasant experience. The alternative, unemployment, is not a viable escape, as it leads to financial problems and social stigma, among other things.

This argument underscores the ethical considerations of bringing new lives into a world where the necessity of work imposes a significant burden on autonomy and freedom, as well as potentially a huge amount of unpleasant experiences, as it is the case for all the people who dislike their job. Therefore, I think that the impact of labor and its constraints constitutes a very compelling reason to reconsider the morality of procreation.

Three Other Considerations In Favor of Antinatalism

Risk-Based Argument for Antinatalism Given Theological Commitments to Eternal Conscious Torment (ECT)

This argument is aimed at religious people who believe in the doctrine of Eternal Conscious Torment (ECT) :

1. Premise 1: It is impermissible to non-consensually impose a risk of infinite harm on others unless doing so is necessary to avoid harm of a similar or greater magnitude.

2. Premise 2: Bringing a child into existence entails non-consensually imposing a risk of infinite harm on that child (the possibility of eternal conscious torment in hell, as affirmed by certain theological traditions within Christianity and Islam), without this being necessary to prevent harm of a similar or greater magnitude.

3. Conclusion: Therefore, it is impermissible to bring children into existence.

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This argument builds on Erik Magnusson's risk-based reasoning but adapts it to account for the theological commitment to eternal conscious torment (ECT). By creating a child, one introduces the risk that the child could suffer infinite harm (eternal conscious torment). This strengthens the case for antinatalism within theological frameworks that affirm ECT.

Ecological Considerations In Favor of Antinatalism

Having one fewer child is identified as the most impactful individual action to reduce one's ecological footprint, particularly in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. It is estimated that having one fewer child saves an average of 58.6 tonnes of CO₂-equivalent (tCO₂e) per year in developed countries. This reduction far exceeds other high-impact actions like living car-free (2.4 tCO₂e/year) or avoiding airplane travel (1.6 tCO₂e saved per transatlantic flight).

Egoistical Considerations In Favor of Antinatalism

As previously discussed and supported in this article, raising children requires an enormous investment of time, energy, and money. By choosing not to have kids, one could literally save hundreds of thousands of dollars to spend as they please and gain thousands of hours to pursue personal interests. Abstaining from procreation makes one both wealthier and freer, as it eliminates the significant financial and time commitments associated with raising children.

Addressing The Best Objection To Prevention-of-Harm-For-The-Being-Created Arguments For Antinatalism

In my view, the best response to those kind of arguments for antinatalism is the claim that most people seem to retroactively and tacitly consent to their creation. This objection resembles the ‘life endorsement objection’ and the ‘hypothetical consent objection’ discussed by Asheel Singh. The objection suggests that since most people do not actively revolt against the fact of their creation—and many even appear happy to have been born—procreation is justified, despite the imposition of significant risks of extreme harm, guaranteed non-trivial harm, and the absence of prior consent.

However, I believe this response fails for the following reasons:

First, even granting that most people give their retroactive, tacit consent, this consent is neither well-informed nor rational. Most individuals have never seriously reflected on the morality of their creation, nor will they ever do so. Only a small percentage of philosophically inclined people seriously engage in such reflections. As a result, this consent is, at best, largely intuitive and, at worst, irrational.

Second, even if people were to reflect carefully and still provide retroactive consent, such consent should be taken with caution. The topic of procreation is heavily influenced by societal norms and natural instincts shaped by evolution, both of which strongly favor natalism. These biases make it difficult to arrive at an objective conclusion.

Finally, even if, in most cases, retroactive consent were given after careful reflection and without bias, I still think it wouldn’t justify procreation. There remains a significant, non-negligible risk of creating individuals who won’t retroactively consent to their creation. This is typically true of most antinatalists, who represent a growing number of people. It has been estimated that there are 36’000’000 antinatalists worldwide.

It will also plausibly be true, for instance, in the case of people commiting or attempting suicide. As mentioned and sourced earlier in this article, according to conservative estimates by the WHO, there are approximately 720,000 suicides per year, with an estimated 20 times more attempted suicides. I don’t think one is justified to take such a risk.

Given these considerations, I do not believe that the ‘retroactive, tacit consent’ objection succeeds in addressing the prevention-of-harm-for-the-being-created arguments for antinatalism. It’s also important to remembear that, even if this objection succeeded, it would still not be enough to justify procreation, as it would only address this kind of arguments for antinataism, but it wouldn’t address the prevention-of-harm-to-other-beings and better-allocation-of-ressources arguments for antinatalism.

The Biggest Problem For Antinatalism

I will discuss now what I consider to be the biggest challenge for antinatalists: the possibility that the success of antinatalism could dramatically increase wild animal suffering. To my knowledge, Brian Tomasik has explored this issue in the greatest depth, so I will use his formulation of the 'objection' as the basis for discussion. Finally, I will present my perspective on how antinatalists should address this concern. I will also touch on why one should consider wild animal suffering to be the greatest problem on earth.

Tomasik's Formulation of the Problem

Brian Tomasik has argued that antinatalism may have unintended negative consequences for wild animals. In his essay Strategic Considerations for Moral Antinatalists, he discusses how reducing or eliminating the human population could lead to increased wild-animal suffering. Tomasik explains that humans currently reduce wild-animal populations by appropriating natural habitats. However, if humanity were to go extinct, these habitats would likely revert to wilderness, potentially increasing the number of wild animals born into lives filled with suffering due to predation, disease, and other natural hardships.

How Should Antinatalists Respond?

First and foremost, it is clear that human extinction—or even a significant population decline—if it were to happen suddenly, would have negative consequences for wild animals. If antinatalism is correct in asserting that human extinction would be a good thing, then it should only occur once the problem of wild animal suffering, the greatest issue on Earth, is addressed.

Does this mean that people should continue having children to mitigate wild animal suffering? I don't think so. The cost of raising a child in the U.S. from birth to age 18 is estimated to be around $300,000. Raising a child not only requires a significant financial investment but also demands a considerable amount of time and energy. It seems reasonable to assume that allocating these resources to projects aimed at reducing wild animal suffering would be far more effective than having a child who might speculatively have a net positive impact on wild animals. For instance, one could donate that $300,000 to the Wild Animal Initiative, a nonprofit organization dedicated to understanding and improving the welfare of wild animals, which is recommended by Animal Charity Evaluators.

Is Wild Animal Suffering the Biggest Problem on Earth?

Humans are only a tiny subset of all sentient beings. The overwhelming majority of sentient beings on earth are non-human animals, and especially wild animals.

​Estimating the number of wild animals on Earth is challenging. However, researchers have provided approximate figures for various groups :

• Wild mammals: Approximately 130 billion individuals globally.

• Wild land vertebrates: Estimates range between 100 billion (10¹¹) and 100 trillion (10¹⁴) individuals.

• Wild marine vertebrates: At least 10 trillion (10¹³) individuals, possibly more. ​

• Terrestrial and marine arthropods (e.g., insects, crustaceans): Each group likely numbers at least 1 quintillion (10¹⁸) individuals.

And wild animals do not live in a Disney movie.
They suffer routinely and massively — from predation, extreme weather, injuries, parasites, disease, extreme hunger and thirst...

Here is how the renowned biologist Richard Dawkins puts it :

”The total amount of suffering per year in the natural world is beyond all decent contemplation. During the minute that it takes me to compose this sentence, thousands of animals are being eaten alive; many others are running for their lives, whimpering with fear; others are slowly being devoured from within by rasping parasites; thousands of all kinds are dying of starvation, thirst, and disease.”⁶

Given the vast number of affected beings (especially if we include insects, which might very well be sentient as well!) and the severity of the harms they endure, it is reasonable to conclude that wild animal suffering is, by far, the most pressing issue on Earth. For more information on this topic, see e.g Brian Tomasik's excellent article The Importance of Wild-Animal Suffering.

Conclusion

This was my steelman of the antinatalism position. I first presented a prevention-of-harm-to-other-beings argument which argues that procreation is wrong in most cases given the harm that the future created being will cause.

I then presented a better-allocation-of-ressources argument which argues that procreation is wrong because the ressources needed for raising a child could prevent a lot of harm if spent differently.

Then, I presented four ‘prevention-of-harm-for-the-being-created’ arguments for antinatalism, which argue that procreation is wrong because of what it does to the future created being. I consider those arguments to be a little bit more controversial, although I still take them very seriously. After this, I discussed what I consider to be the best objection to those arguments, which I named the ‘retroactive, tacit consent objection’, and explained why I think it fails. Finally, I discussed what I consider to be the biggest problem for antinatalism, i.e the possibility that it might augment wild animal suffering, and how antinatalists should address this.

To conclude, I believe that the case for antinatalism is remarkably strong, and I anticipate that in the coming years, the position will gain greater recognition and popularity—particularly within academic circles—as more ethicists engage with and appreciate the strength of these arguments. I suspect that a lot of the reluctance to take antinatalism seriously comes from the fact that it confronts deeply ingrained social norms and powerful natural instincts instilled in us by evolution. These factors, among others, make it difficult for many to show an appropriate level of consideration towards the position, despite its strong moral appeal.

Appendix

Antinatalism And Preexistence

As we saw, contemporary antinatalism—especially in its analytic form—typically rests on a rarely questioned metaphysical premise: that individuals do not exist prior to their birth. In arguments such as David Benatar’s, procreation is conceived as the act that brings a new person into existence, initiating a moral subject where none previously existed. This assumption structures the moral assessment of procreation: it supports the claim that non-procreation harms no one, and frames birth as an act of creation rather than transfer or continuation.

Yet this naturalistic assumption, while common in current debates, does not exhaust the range of metaphysical possibilities. Numerous philosophical and religious traditions posit some form of preexistence before birth. This is true of karmic systems (Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism), various strands of Platonism, Gnostic and Origenist currents, and several contemporary speculative models involving panpsychism or informational continuity. Even if these views appear metaphysically remote, it is difficult—epistemically—to assign them a strictly zero probability.

A rigorous philosophical analysis should therefore consider how these alternative scenarios would affect the moral evaluation of procreation, at least with respect to “philanthropic” arguments for antinatalism. What becomes of standard antinatalist arguments if one grants—even hypothetically—that individuals preexist birth? How must Benatar’s asymmetry, or other antinatalist arguments, be revised in a world where birth is not an ontological beginning?

Typology of Conceptions of Preexistence

1. Karmic Preexistence (Hindu Traditions)

The soul (jīva/ātman) is eternal and transmigrates through various states—celestial, intermediate, or infernal—depending on past karma. Birth is a temporary manifestation, not an absolute beginning.

2. Preexistence Without a Permanent Self (Buddhism)

Buddhism denies an eternal self but posits a causal continuum of consciousness. Pre-birth states may be pleasant, yet remain marked by the structural unsatisfactoriness (dukkha) of conditioned existence.

3. Continuous Embodiment (Jainism)

Jain doctrine holds that all non-liberated souls are always embodied, in either gross or subtle forms. There is no disembodied interval. Birth is a corporeal transition, not creation.

4. Platonic Preexistence

The soul preexists in a higher, intelligible realm, contemplating the Forms. Embodiment is a degradation, fall, or forgetting.

5. Western Religious Models (Gnostic, Origenist, etc.)

Souls are sometimes held to preexist in celestial or intermediate states. Birth may be punishment, mission, or pedagogical process depending on the doctrine.

6. Speculative Naturalistic Preexistence

Some contemporary models (e.g., panpsychism, informational continuity) allow for a form of preexistence that need not carry a fixed moral valence.

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Implications of Preexistence for Antinatalism

1. Hindu Models

Valence depends on karmic origin:

• Preexistence in a higher realm → birth is a loss.

• Preexistence in a lower or painful state → birth may be an improvement.
  Antinatalist conclusions become conditional and non-universal.

2. Buddhist Models

All conditioned states involve dukkha; birth perpetuates the cycle.
Antinatalism tends to be reinforced.

3. Jain Models

No neutral pre-birth state exists; every soul is always embodied.
Birth is neither creation nor automatic improvement.

4. Platonic Models

Birth is a fall from a superior state → strongly antinatalist implications.

5. Western Preexistential Models

If embodiment = punishment → antinatalism strengthened.
If embodiment = mission or pedagogical stage → antinatalism might be weakened or neutralized.

6. Speculative Naturalisms

Neutrally valenced preexistence → Benatarian antinatalism largely intact.
Negative preexistence → birth is potentially beneficial.
Positive preexistence → birth is potentially harmful.

Conclusion

Surveying the wide range of preexistence models reveals that the assumption that birth is an ontological beginning is only one metaphysical option among many. The moral status of procreation, at least with respect to “philanthropic” arguments for antinatalism, might shift quite drastically depending on the valence assigned to pre-birth existence: birth can be a loss, a benefit or a neutral continuation. Given the non-zero probability of those alternatives, I think that antinatalists should at least give them more considerations in their typical discourse.

1. Arthur Schopenhauer, On the Sufferings of the World, in Studies in Pessimism, trans. T. Bailey Saunders (New York: Macmillan, 1891)

2. I say “morally wrong or bad” because it depends on who is procreating. In the cases of informed moral agents procreating, it is morally wrong, while in the cases of non-moral agents procreating, it’s morally bad. I make this distinction (like many others) that something can be morally problematic in two senses ; It can be morally bad, e.g. in the cases of cancers, natural disasters, car accidents etc. or morally wrong, like in the cases of murders, thefts, rapes etc.

3. Stuart Rachels, The Immorality of Having Children, Ethic Theory and Moral Practice (Springer, 2014)

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1. David Benatar and David Wasserman, Debating Procreation: Is It Wrong to Reproduce? (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), p.55.

5. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, "Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm," Legal Theory 5, no. 2 (1999)

6. Richard Dawkins, River Out of Eden: A Darwinian View of Life, Basic Books, 1995, pp. 131–132.